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Transitions among States behind Interactive Agent Model 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we introduce a simple interactive agent mechanism, 
where the distribution of returns generated from the mechanism match 
stylized facts in financial markets. We introduce one more key factor, the 
length of time horizon on performance evaluations between strategies, 
which also has a significant influence on price fluctuations. To investigate 
the transitions among states, we introduce a Markov transition matrix, 
Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix, and Inertia. Our simulation results 
show the stickiness of states switching from one to another, and the longer 
length of time horizon on performance evaluations would generate more 
complex dynamic price fluctuations. We link our simple heterogeneous 
agent mechanism with Markov trajectory entropy and provide a total score 
and probability density functions of representations under two states as 
applications for the mechanism. 
 
Key terms: interactive agent mechanism; Perron‐Frobenius transition 
matrix; Inertia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transitions among States behind Interactive Agent Model 
 
1 Introduction 
     André Kostolany, German stock market guru, wrote in his 
reminiscence Die Kunst, über Geld nachzudenken discussing the phase 
transitions of financial markets at the section Das Ei des Kostolany. He 
suggested investors buy when stocks are extremely underpriced, hold them 
during upward trend, and leave market when their prices are exaggerated.  
     Since the turn of the century, several researchers have introduced 
and developed heterogeneous interacting agent models and have estimated 
the parameters of these models. However, there are only a few studies that 
have investigated the transition among states in heterogeneous interacting 
agent model.1 Cheng and Kim (2017) introduced two key factors which 
would affect price fluctuations: (1) the risk tolerance of fundamentalists 
and (2) the relative funding rate of positive ‐ feedback traders versus 
fundamentalists, which would affect price fluctuations. In this paper, one 
more factor is introduced, length of time horizon on performance 
evaluations between strategies, to interpret intensity of choice to switch 
strategies proposed as Brock and Hommes (1997). 
                                                      
1 Most studies focus on generating phenomena mimic the stylized face in the financial 
market. See, for example, Kirman (1993), Lux (1995, 1997, 1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999, 
2000), Farmer (2002), and Farmer and Joshi (2002). 
     The traders’ experiences is expected to be related to the length of time 
horizon on performance evaluations between strategies, where the longer 
length of time horizon on performance evaluations would generate more 
complex dynamic price fluctuations. Our simulation results are in line with 
Greenwood and Nagel (2009), where the shorter l length of time horizon on 
performance evaluations would generate phenomenon that the state would 
switch between bubble and crash. 
     To investigate how the length of time horizon on performance 
evaluations would affect the transition among states, we include 
heterogeneous agent models, the noise trader approach, and the leverage 
cycle in our mechanism, and introduce a Markov transition matrix, Perron‐
Frobenius transition matrix, and Inertia to investigate how the length of 
time horizon on performance evaluations would affect the transition among 
states. We show that the stickiness of states to switch from one to another, 
and the longer length of time horizon on performance evaluations would 
generate more complex dynamic price fluctuations. We also connect our 
mechanism with Markov trajectory entropy proposed by Ekroot and Cover 
(1993) and provide total score and probability density functions of 
representations under two states as applications for the mechanism. We 
propose a problem of connecting multiple systems into one and investigate 
the state transition behind the system at the last section. 
 
2 Mechanism 
     We adapt the model (Case 1) from Cheng and Kim (2017). Suppose 
there is a single stock market that is populated with three types of traders: 
fundamentalists, positive‐feedback traders, and noise traders. All traders 
in the market are short‐sighted and possess beliefs on next period’s price 
for the stock. 
     Fundamentalists believe stock prices will move back to its 
fundamental values. They form their expected price based on the 
differences between fundamental value and current market price, 1ft tp p+ − , 
and adjust their expected price each period. The fundamentalists’ demand 
for stock ftx  and adaptive process 1ftp +  are shown in equations (1) and (2). 
( )11 exp 1 1
f f
t tf
t f f
t t
p p
x
r p r p
α +  −  = − − 
    
                                  (1) 
( )* * *1 2,
1
,  where 
t
f
t t t t t t
t
p p p p p pν ε+
=
= + − = +∑                              (2) 
where fα  is the parameter indicating the eagerness of fundamentalists 
towards profits, fr  is the funding rate fundamentalists face for financing 
their positions, *p  denotes the initial fundamental value of the stock, ν  
captures the speed at which fundamentalists expect the market price to 
move back to fundamental value, and 2,tε  represents the shock terms 
resulting from changes of policies and rare events. 
     Positive ‐ feedback traders chase market trends. They form their 
expected price based on the differences between their previous expected 
price and current market price, 1ct tp p+ − , and adjust their expected price 
each period. The positive ‐ feedback traders’ demand for stock ctx  and 
adaptive process 1ctp +  are shown in equations (3) and (4). 
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where cα  is the parameter showing positive‐feedback traders’ eagerness 
towards profits, β  is the coefficient of the wealth effect, and cr  is the 
funding rate positive‐feedback traders pay for financing their positions, 
µ  is the error correction coefficient representing how sensitive positive‐
feedback traders correct their expected stock price for the next period. 
     Accumulated noise traders’ demand for stock ntx  is as follows： 
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n
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where γ  is the reaction strength of noise traders to noisy information and 
1,tε  comes from the demand for the stock from liquidity traders and 
traders with biased belief or sentiments. 1,tε  is normally distributed, and 
2,tε  varies with different probability distributions. 
     There is a market maker whose role is collecting orders, announcing 
execution prices, and executing transactions. The market price each period 
is determined by the demand of the stock： 
( )1 1 f c nt t t t t t tp p n x x xθ κ ξ κ ξ+  − = − − + +                                 (7) 
where θ  is the market sensitivity corresponding to changes in the 
demand for stocks, n  is the total number of traders in the market, and tκ  
reflects the population fraction of positive‐feedback traders in the market 
at each period. Noise traders exist in the market with a fixed weight ξ , 
and the proportion of fundamentalists in the market equals 1 tκ ξ− − . 
     Different from Cheng and Kim (2017), we let fundamentalists and 
positive‐feedback traders switch to each other’s strategy according to the 
performance differentials of recent history record back to past period 
1t l− +  if t l> . The population fractions of fundamentalists and 
positive‐feedback traders are updated each period as follows： 
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where ϕ  is the intensity of choice to switch strategies, ftπ  and ctπ  are 
the cumulative profits realized by fundamentalists and positive‐feedback 
traders during the length l  of history record respectively at each period. 
     We relax fα  and cr  being able to vary across periods in the 
mechanism. Fundamentalists become trading more aggressively when they 
observe more traders switching to positive‐feedback traders’ strategy, but 
they trade less aggressively as they are close to dominate the market. 
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We can see in equation (9) that fα  increases as tκ  is larger than 
1 0.1ξ− − , but fα  decreases when tκ  is less than 0.1.2 cr  also represents 
for relative funding difficulty of positive‐feedback traders versus 
fundamentalists. As the stock price increases, positive‐feedback traders 
face higher funding rate for financing their positions. 
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2 Here 0.1 is the threshold ϑ  to induce fundamentalists having reaction responding to 
the popularity of their strategy. 
We set the minimum and the maximum of cr  equal 0.1 and 0.95 
respectively. 
 
3 Results 
     Similar to Cheng and Kim (2017), we fix all the parameters at the 
initial settings and allow the length of evaluations on performances l , the 
initial fα , and the initial cr  to vary within the considered range with 
different shock terms based on the normal, student t (t), and α ‐stable 
distributions, or GARCH processes. Table 1 shows the initial settings. 
 
3.1 Simulations 
     The mechanism enable us to generate different scenario in a trial and 
also remain the characteristics of the model developed in Cheng and Kim 
(2017). Figure 1 presents the examples of simulations with different initial 
settings. Figures 2 and 3 show the autocorrelation of (absolute) simulated 
returns. In the mechanism, simulated returns are weakly autocorrelated 
while the absolute simulated returns have significant positive and slow 
decaying autocorrelations. We can see in Table 2 that the simulated 
returns are most stationary, but reject the null hypothesis of 
Kwiatkowski‐Phillips‐Schmidt‐Shin test that the simulated returns are not 
trend stationary when l  equals to 500. 
 
3.2 Transitions among states 
     Fundamentalists have more chance to dominate the market when 
they are more willing than positive‐feedback traders to take risks. Also, 
more crises occur as positive‐feedback traders have higher funding costs 
compared to fundamentalists (Cheng and Kim, 2017). We then define 
different states based on the magnitudes of ftα  and ctr . 
{ }: ,  8,  0.2f c f cP t t t tS r rα α= < <                                         (11) 
{ }: ,  8,  0.2f c f cF t t t tS r rα α= ≥ <                                         (12) 
{ }: ,  0.2f c cC t t tS r rα= ≥                                               (13) 
Equation (11), (12), and (13) present the conditions for states PS , FS , and 
CS , where positive‐feedback traders (resp. fundamentalists) are more able 
to dominate the market when ftα  is less (resp. larger) than 8 and more 
crises occur when ctr  is larger than 0.2. Figures 4 and 5 present the 
examples of trajectories of ftα  and ctr  with the transitions of states 
across periods for l  equals to 10 and 500, where 1, 2, and 3 represent for 
PS , CS , and FS  respectively. Our results indicate that the larger l  would 
induce more complicate dynamics of state transitions. 
 
3.3 Representations of states transitions 
     We calculate the Markov transition matrix of states M , and define 
the Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix P  with 1ijP =  if 0ijM >  and 
1ijP =  if 0ijM =  for , , ,i j P F C= . Figures 6 and 7 are the examples of 
Markov transition matrix and Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix, where 
our results show the stickiness of states to switch from one to another. 
     Our mechanism has the property that if a state iS , where , ,i P F C= , 
is reached, the probability that next period is still at the same state iS  is 
positive. That is, ( ), 1 ,Pr 0i t i tS S+ >  for , ,i P F C= . Because of this 
characteristic, we can reduce the number of representations for states 
transitions to forty‐four, which we show in the Appendix 1. 
     When l  is small, market tends to switch between two states 
(representations before the 13rd). However, the state transitions become 
more complicated as l  goes larger (see Figure 8). Shock terms based on α
‐stable distributions, or GARCH processes (except FIGARCH processes) 
would also induce complicate state transitions when l  is small (see 
Figures 9 and 10). In addition, market most likely stay at CS  (the 2nd 
representation ) when the initial cr  is larger than 0.3 (see Figure 11). 
 
     To understand more about the phenomenon, let ,lT ϑ  be the set of 
representations occurred in simulations. If we look at the strategy switch 
function 
( )( )1
1
1 expt f ct t
ξκ
ϕ π π
+
−
=
+ −
, we can see that the population fractions 
of fundamentalists and positive‐feedback traders each period are 
determined by the cumulative profits realized of fundamentalists and 
positive‐feedback traders during the length l  of history record. If l  is 
small, f ct tπ π−  is within a small range such that 1tκ +  tends not to meet the 
levels ( 1tκ ϑ+ <  or 1 1tκ ξ ϑ+ > − − ) which induce fundamentalists to trade 
less (or more) aggressively. Thus, the state tends to stay at the same state 
or switches between another states. If l  is large, 1tκ +  has more chances to 
hit the levels which induce fundamentalists’ reactions and we would 
observe more complicated state transitions. In addition, we would also 
observe more complicated state transitions if the threshold ϑ  is larger 
(see Figure 12). We conclude that the cardinality of ,lT ϑ , ,lT ϑ , is smaller 
(larger) if l  is smaller (larger) or ϑ  is smaller (larger), 
, ,  if  or l lT T l lϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ′ ′ ′ ′≤ < < . 
 
3.4 Inertia of states 
     We define the distance between current state tS  and the state in 
next time periods t sS +  as follows. 
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Note that if ( ), ,  i t s t t sd S S+ +  equals 1 does not indicate that ( ), ,  i t s t t sd S S′ ′+ +  is 
also equal to 1 for s s′ < . We then define the inertia ,i t sI +  for the state 
starting with iS , where , ,i P C F= , in the following: 
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Because of the stickiness of states to switch from one to another, the inertia 
,i t sI +  tells us the probability of escaping the initial state tS  at time period 
t s+ . If ,i t sI +  is larger, the probability that market stays at the same state 
as tS  is smaller. 
     If the initial cr  is less than 0.3, the measures of inertia differ with 
shock terms based on different distributions and processes. For the shock 
terms based on normal, t, and FIGARCH processes, CI  tends to be larger 
compared to PI  and FI  in the short term, but tends to be smaller in the 
long term (Figure 13). We also observe the situation that PI  or FI  is the 
smallest across time period (Figure 14). For the shock terms based on α
‐stable distributions and GARCH processes, CI  tends to be the smallest 
across time period (Figure 15). When the initial cr  is larger than 0.3, 
market most likely stays at CS . The average inertia of CS  is extremely 
small and the average inertia of PS  and FS  are close to 1 as time period 
goes longer (Figure 16). 
 
4 Applications 
     We introduce total score, entropy of Markov trajectories, and 
probability density function of representations for two states in this 
section. 
 
4.1 Total score 
     We define total score t sTotal +  as follows, 
( )
, , , ,
Prt s ij t s t i
i P C F j P C F
Total w S S S+ +
= =
= =∑ ∑ .                                (16) 
where ijw  is the score assigned to the state switching from iS  to jS . 
Let the score matrix W  and the Markov transition matrix M  as follows, 
1
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We define preference relations of state transition ki kjS S  if ki kjw w<  for 
, , , ,i j k P C F= ; ki kjS S  if ki kjw w=  for , , , ,i j k P C F= . Let bestS  be the state 
transition with highest score ( ( )
, , , iji j P C F
Max w
=
) and worstS  be the state transition 
with lowest score ( ( )
, , ,
min iji j P C F w= ). For the rest state transitions, there exists 
( )0,1λ∈  such that ( )1rest best worstS S Sλ λ+ − . From our definition, the total 
score T  is equal to 1 1 13
3 3 3P C F
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, where 
( )1 , , ,i i iP i iC i i iFK p w q w p q w i P C F= + + − − = . We can see that 
1 1 1
3 3 3P C F
K K K+ +  belongs to the convex set with respect to the preference 
we assign to each state transition. Similar discussions apply to the 
transitions among finite n  states. 
 
Proposition 4.1 
If the Markov transition matrix M  is positive, T  preserves the 
preferences assigned to state transitions. 
 
     We can calculate the total scores to find the optimal choice for a group 
of initial settings. Suppose we let 5FFw = , 2.5PF CFw w= = , 0PP FPw w= = , 
1CPw = , 2.5PC FCw w= = − , 5CCw = − . We calculate the total scores if the 
transition matrices are all positive in observed time periods. The optimal 
choice is the initial settings with the highest total score. We can see in 
Figure 17 that l  equals to 400 is optimal compared to l  equals to 100, 
200, 300, and 500 within our choices. Note that 0.3cr ≥  is less desirable 
because the market most likely remain at CS . 
 
4.2 Markov trajectory entropy 
     Ekroot and Cover (1993) derived the general closed form solution of 
Markov trajectory entropy. For a finite state irreducible Markov transition 
matrix M , the entropy rate ( )
,
logi ij ij
i j
H M Mχ µ= −∑  where µ  is the 
stationary distribution of the transition matrix satisfying j i ij
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logij ij
j
M M−∑ . Thus, the matrix of first step entropies is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
2 2 2*
m m m
H M H M H M
H M H M H M
H
H M H M H M
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
 
 
 =
 
 
  


   

.                              (18) 
Let H  be the matrix of Markov trajectory entropies, the diagonal matrix 
H∆  associated with H  is as follows, 
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Theorem 4.2.1 (Ekroot and Cover, 1993) 
For an irreducible Markov chain, the entropy iiH  of the random trajectory 
from state i  back to state i  is ( )
i
H χ
µ
. 
 
Theorem 4.2.2 (Ekroot and Cover, 1993) 
If M  is the transition matrix of an irreducible finite state Markov chain, 
then the matrix H  of trajectory entropies is K K H∆− +  where  
( ) ( )1 *K I M A H H− ∆= − + − , ij jjK K=  for all ,i j , and ij jA µ=  for all ,i j . 
 
     The entries in the matrix of trajectory entropies indicate the 
complexity of trajectories from a state i  to itself or to the other states j . 
A larger trajectory entropy ijH  for , , ,i j P C F=  indicates that the 
trajectory from state i  to states j  could be more complicated. Figure 18 
presents the example of the matrix of Markov trajectory entropies from our 
mechanism. We can see that the entries in the diagonal matrix of Markov 
trajectory entropy are much smaller compared to other entries in the 
matrix, which shows the stickiness of states to switch from one to another. 
We can also observe that the trajectory could be more complicated from 
state FS  to state PS  than the trajectory be from state PS  to FS . That is, 
the length of trajectory could be longer from state FS  to state PS  
compared to the length of trajectory from state PS  to FS . 
 
4.3 Probability density functions of representations under two states 
     Let M  be the Markov transition matrix of two states AS  and BS  
where AAM p=  and BBM q= . 
1
1
p p
M
q q
− 
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                                                  (20) 
Let h  be the history of state transitions, 
( ){ }0 1 2  or  and 0,1,2, ,N t A Bh S S S S S S S t N= = =  .                      
(21)  
For a given history of state transitions, we could categorize the history into 
a specific representation (Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix). Without 
loss of generality, we start with the initial state AS  moving for N  steps 
and investigate the probabilities of each representation occurred. 
 
 
4.3.1 Representation A 
1 0
0 0
 
 
 
 
     Representation A occurs when remaining at the initial state AS  for 
the whole N  moves, ( ){ }0 1 2  and 0,1,2, ,N t Ah S S S S S S t N= = =  . The 
probability 1 0Pr
0 0
Np
  
=  
  
 for 1N ≥ .                             (22) 
 
4.3.2 Representation B 
1 1
0 0
 
 
 
 
     Representation B occurs when the initial state AS  remain at the 
same state for 1N −  steps but switch to state BS  at the last step, 
( ){ }0 1 2  for 0,1, 2, , 1 and N t A N Bh S S S S S S t N S S= = = − =  . The probability 
( )11 1 1 ,  2Pr
0 0 0                ,  1
Np p N
N
−  − ≥ 
=   =  
                                    (23) 
 
4.3.3 Representation C 
1 1
0 1
 
 
 
 
     Representation C occurs when the initial state AS  remain at the 
same state for 2N −  steps but switch to state BS  for the ( )1
thN −  step 
and stay at the last step, 
( ){ }0 1 2  for 0,1, 2, , 2  and  for 1,N t A t Bh S S S S S S t N S S t N N= = = − = = −  . 
The probability ( )
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N
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=   =  
.                 (24) 
 
4.3.4 Representation D 
1 1
1 0
 
 
 
 
     Representation D occurs when state AS  remains at the same state 
and state BS  switches to state AS  both happen at least once in the whole 
N  steps and 3N ≥ . To be clear, we discuss the cases separately for 3N ≥ . 
 
(i) 3N =  
     [ ]( ) [ ]( ){ },A A B A A B A Ah S S S S S S S S=  where we would have two 
components AS  or [ ]B AS S  in the history of Representation D. When 
3N = , we have 2! choices of having AS  and [ ]B AS S  happened once. The 
probability ( )( )
1 1
Pr 2! 1 1
1 0
p p q
  
= − −  
  
 when 3N = . 
 
(ii) 4N =  
     [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ){ }, ,A A A B A A A B A A A B A A Ah S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S= . When 4N = , we 
have 3!
2!1!
 choices of having AS  happened twice and [ ]B AS S  happened 
once. The probability ( )( )2
1 1 3!Pr 1 1
1 0 2!1!
p p q
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(iii) 5N =  
     If AS  happens three times and [ ]B AS S  happens once, 
[ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( ){ }, , ,A A A A B A A A A B A A A A B A A A A B A A A Ah S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S=
 which we have 4!
3!1!
 choices. The probability of having AS  happened 
three times and [ ]B AS S  happened once is as follows, 
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     If AS  happens once and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, 
[ ][ ]( ) [ ] [ ]( ) [ ][ ]( ){ }, ,A A B A B A A B A A B A A B A B A Ah S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S S=  which we 
have 3!
1!2!
 choices. The probability of having AS  happened once and 
[ ]B AS S  happened twice is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 2
1 1 3!Pr  once,  twice 1 1
1 0 1!2!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 5N = . 
     The probability of Representation D occurred when 5N =  is the sum 
of the probabilities which AS  happens three times and [ ]B AS S  happens 
once or AS  happens once and [ ]B AS S  happens twice. 
( )( ) ( )( ) 23
1 1 4! 3!Pr 1 1 1 1
1 0 3!1! 1!2!
p p q p p q
  
= − − + − −     
  
 when 5N = . 
 
(iiii) 6N =  
     If AS  happens four times and [ ]B AS S  happens once, we have 
5!
4!1!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened four times and [ ]B AS S  
happened once is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( )4
1 1 5!Pr  4 times,  once 1 1
1 0 4!1!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −  
  
 when 6N = . 
     If AS  and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, we have 
4!
2!2!
 choices. The 
probability of having AS  and [ ]B AS S  happened twice is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 22
1 1 4!Pr  twice,  twice 1 1
1 0 2!2!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 6N = . 
     The probability of Representation D occurred when 6N =  is the sum 
of the probabilities which AS  happens four times and [ ]B AS S  happens 
once or AS  and [ ]B AS S  happens twice. 
( )( ) ( )( ) 24 2
1 1 5! 4!Pr 1 1 1 1
1 0 4!1! 2!2!
p p q p p q
  
= − − + − −     
  
 when 6N = . 
 
(v) 7N =  
     If AS  happens five times and [ ]B AS S  happens once, we have 
6!
5!1!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened five times and [ ]B AS S  
happened once is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( )5
1 1 6!Pr  5 times,  once 1 1
1 0 5!1!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −  
  
 when 7N = . 
     If AS  happens three times and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, we have 
5!
3!2!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened three times and [ ]B AS S  
happened twice is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 23
1 1 5!Pr  3 times,  twice 1 1
1 0 3!2!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 7N = . 
     If AS  happens once and [ ]B AS S  happens three times, we have 
4!
1!3!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened once and [ ]B AS S  
happened three times is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 3
1 1 4!Pr  once,  3 times 1 1
1 0 1!3!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 7N = . 
     The probability of Representation D occurred when 7N =  is the sum 
of the probabilities which AS  happens five times and [ ]B AS S  happens 
once, AS  happens three times and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, or AS  happens 
once and [ ]B AS S  happens three times. 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 35 3
1 1 6! 5! 4!Pr 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 5!1! 3!2! 1!3!
p p q p p q p p q
  
= − − + − − + − −         
  
 
when 7N = . 
 
(vi) 8N =  
     If AS  happens six times and [ ]B AS S  happens once, we have 
7!
6!1!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened six times and [ ]B AS S  
happened once is as follows, 
 [ ] ( )( )6
1 1 7!Pr  6 times,  once 1 1
1 0 6!1!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −  
  
 when 8N = . 
     If AS  happens four times and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, we have 
6!
4!2!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened four times and [ ]B AS S  
happened twice is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 24
1 1 6!Pr  4 times,  twice 1 1
1 0 4!2!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 8N = . 
     If AS  happens twice and [ ]B AS S  happens three times, we have 
5!
2!3!
 
choices. The probability of having AS  happened twice and [ ]B AS S  
happened three times is as follows, 
[ ] ( )( ) 32
1 1 5!Pr  twice,  3 times 1 1
1 0 2!3!A B A
S S S p p q
  
= − −     
  
 when 8N = . 
     The probability of Representation D occurred when 8N =  is the sum 
of the probabilities which AS  happens six times and [ ]B AS S  happens once, 
AS  happens four times and [ ]B AS S  happens twice, or AS  happens twice 
and [ ]B AS S  happens three times. 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )2 36 4 2
1 1 7! 6! 5!Pr 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 6!1! 4!2! 2!3!
p p q p p q p p q
  
= − − + − − + − −         
  
 when 8N = . 
 
(vii) N  steps 
From above discussion for Representation D, we can solve the probability 
of Representation D occurred as follows. 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
12 1
1 1
2
12 1
1 1
2
1 !
1 1 ,  3,   odd
2 1 ! 1 !
1 1 1 !
Pr 1 1 ,  3,   even
1 0 2 1 ! 1 !
                                
N N nN N n
Nn N
N N nN N n
Nn N
n
p p q N N
N N n N n
n
p p q N N
N N n N n
− +− − +
−
= − +
− +− − +
 = − − + 
 
−
− − ≥  − − + − +  
  − 
= − − ≥     − − + − +     
∑
∑
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 2
3
2
2 2
            0                                                          ,  1, 2
1 !
1 1 ,  3,   odd
2 2 ! 1 !
1 !
                  1 1
2 2 ! 1 !
N N nn N
Nn
n N
N
n
p p q N N
n N N n
n
p p q
n N N n
− +− −
+
=
− −








 =


−
− − ≥  − − − +
−
= − − − − − +
∑
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
4
2
12 2
1
2
,  3,   even
                           0                                                     ,  1, 2
1 !
1 1 ,  3
2 2 ! 1 !                  
N N n
Nn
N nn N
Nn N
N N
N
n
p p q N
n N N n
− +
+
=
− +− −
−= −





≥ 


=


−
− − ≥  − − − +=
∑
1
                                                 0                                                     ,  1, 2
N
N
+




=
∑
Thus, the probability 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 2
1 1
2
1 !
1 1 ,  31 1 2 2 ! 1 !Pr
1 0
                                                 0                                                     ,  1, 2
N N nn N
Nn N
n
p p q N
n N N n
N
− +− −
− = − +  
−
− − ≥       − − − +=   
   
=
∑      (25) 
 
4.3.5 Representation E 
0 1
0 0
 
 
 
 
     Representation E occurs only for 1N = , ( ){ }A Bh S S= . The probability 
0 1    0   ,  2
Pr
0 0 1 ,  1
N
p N
  ≥ 
=   − =  
.                                         (26) 
 
4.3.6 Representation F 
0 1
0 1
 
 
 
 
     Representation F occurs when the initial state AS  switches to state 
BS  in the first move and stays at state BS  for the rest moves, 
( ){ }0 1 2 0  and  for 1, 2, ,N A t Bh S S S S S S S S t N= = = =  . The probability 
( ) 10 1 1 ,  2Pr
0 1         0       ,  1
Np q N
N
−  − ≥ 
=   =  
.                                     (27) 
 
4.3.7 Representation G 
0 1
1 0
 
 
 
 
     Representation G occurs when states AS  and state BS  switch to 
each other without staying at the same state, 
( ){ }0 1 2  for  even and  for  oddN t A t Bh S S S S S S t S S t= = = . The probability 
( ) ( )
1
2 20 1 1 1 ,  2Pr
1 0                0                ,  1
N N
p q N
N
+   
         − − ≥=  
   =
.                            (28) 
 
4.3.8 Representation H 
0 1
1 1
 
 
 
 
     Representation H occurs when the initial state AS  switches to state 
BS  in the first move with the rest moves similar to Representation D but 
starting with initial state BS  moving for 1N −  steps. 
Thus, the probability 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1
2 1
2
2
1 !
1 1 1 ,  4
2 1 ! !
0 1
Pr                                 1 1                                              ,  3
1 1
                               
N N nn N
Nn N
n
p q q p N
n N N n
q p q N
− −− −
− = −  
−
− − − ≥  − − −
  
= − − =  
  
∑
                  0                                                     ,  1, 2N





 =


     (29) 
 
4.3.9 Representation I 
1 1
1 1
 
 
 
 
     Representation I is the most complicated case among all the 
representations, and the probability of Representation I occurred is equal 
to one minus the sum of probabilities that Representations A, B, C,...,H 
occur. Thus, the probability 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 2 1 2 2
12 2
1 1
2
1
2 1
2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 !
1 1
2 2 ! 1 !1 1
Pr
1 1 1 !
1 1 1 ,  4
2 1 ! !
       
N N
N N N N
N N nn N
Nn N
N N nn N
Nn N
p p p p p q p q p q
n
p p q
n N N n
n
p q q p N
n N N n
+   
− − −       
− +− −
− = − +  
− −− −
− = −  
− − − − − − − − − −
−
− − −  − − − +  
=  
   −
− − − − ≥  − − −
∑
∑
                                         0                                                           ,  1, 2,3N










 =
 (30) 
 
     Similarly, if we start with initial state BS , which  
initial initial 
0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0B AS S
M M   =    
   
, we can apply the formulas discussed above 
to derive the probability density function of each representation starting 
with initial state BS . 
 
Proposition 4.3 
Let M  be two‐state Markov transition matrix, 
1
1
p p
M
q q
− 
=  − 
. 
(1) The probability density function of representations with initial state AS  
moving for N  steps is as follows. 
A. 0
1 0
Pr ,  1
0 0
N
AS S p N
  
= = ≥  
  
 
B. ( )
1
0
1 1 1 ,  2Pr
0 0 0                ,  1
N
A
p p N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
C. 
( )2
0
1 1 1 ,  3Pr
0 1             0          ,  1, 2
N
A
p p q N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
D. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 2
1 10 2
1 !
1 1 ,  31 1 2 2 ! 1 !Pr
1 0
                                                 0                                                     ,  1, 2
N N nn N
Nn NA
n
p p q N
n N N nS S
N
− +− −
− = − +  
−
− − ≥       − − − += =   
  
=
∑


E. 0
0 1    0   ,  2
Pr
0 0 1 ,  1A
N
S S
p N
  ≥ 
= =   − =  
 
F. ( )
1
0
0 1 1 ,  2Pr
0 1         0       ,  1
N
A
p q N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
G. ( ) ( )
1
2 2
0
0 1 1 1 ,  2Pr
1 0                0                ,  1
N N
A
p q NS S
N
+   
         − − ≥= =  
   =
 
 
 
 
H. 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( )
1
2 1
2
2
0
1 !
1 1 1 ,  4
2 1 ! !
0 1
Pr                                 1 1                                              ,  3
1 1
                          
N N nn N
Nn N
A
n
p q q p N
n N N n
S S q p q N
− −− −
− = −  
−
− − − ≥  − − −
  
= = − − =  
  
∑
                       0                                                     ,  1, 2N





 =


I. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 2 1 2 2
12 2
1 1
2
0
1
2 1
2
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 !
1 1
2 2 ! 1 !1 1
Pr
1 1 1 !
1 1 1 ,  4
2 1 ! !
  
N N
N N N N
N N nn N
Nn N
A
N N nn N
Nn N
p p p p p q p q p q
n
p p q
n N N n
S S
n
p q q p N
n N N n
+   
− − −       
− +− −
− = − +  
− −− −
− = −  
− − − − − − − − − −
−
− − −  − − − +  
= =  
   −
− − − − ≥  − − −
∑
∑
                                              0                                                           ,  1, 2,3N










 =
(2) The probability density function of representations with initial state BS  
moving for N  steps is as follows. 
A'. 0
0 0
Pr ,  1
0 1
N
BS S q N
  
= = ≥  
  
 
B'. ( )
1
0
0 0 1 ,  2Pr
1 1 0                ,  1
N
B
q q N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
C'. ( )
2
0
1 0 1 ,  3Pr
1 1             0          ,  1, 2
N
B
q q p N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
D'. 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
12 2
1 10 2
1 !
1 1 ,  30 1 2 2 ! 1 !Pr
1 1
                                                 0                                                     ,  1, 2
N N nn N
Nn NB
n
q q p N
n N N nS S
N
− +− −
− = − +  
−
− − ≥       − − − += =   
  
=
∑


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0 0    0   ,  2
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1 0 1 ,  1B
N
S S
q N
  ≥ 
= =   − =  
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0
1 0 1 ,  2Pr
1 0         0       ,  1
N
B
q p N
S S
N
−  − ≥ 
= =   =  
 
G'. ( ) ( )
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− −− −
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−
− − −  − − − +  
= =  
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− − − − ≥  − − −
∑
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



 =
 
5 Conclusions 
     In this paper, we have discussed a simple heterogeneous agent 
mechanism with their applications. We introduce one more factor, length of 
evaluations on performances between strategies, which could interpret 
intensity of choice to switch strategies proposed by Brock and Hommes 
(1997). Our results show the stickiness of states switching from one to 
another, and the longer length of evaluations on performances would 
generate more complex dynamic price fluctuations. 
     We then introduce different forms of transition matrix and inertia to 
investigate how the length of evaluations on performances would affect the 
transition among states. We connect our mechanism with Markov 
trajectory entropy proposed by Ekroot and Cover (1993) and provide total 
score and probability density functions of representations under two states 
as applications for the mechanism. 
     Further research would be to generalize probability density functions 
of representations under finite N states and provide more theoretical 
foundations for the mechanism. 
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Appendix 1: Representations (Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix) 
 
 
Tie 1 Tie 2 
○1 E  A○2 E  A○3 E  A○4 E  A○5 E  
1 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
 
 
 
  
 
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
 
 
 
  
 
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
0 1 0
0 0 0
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 2 
A○6 E  A○7 E  A○8 E  A○9 E  A○10E  
1 0 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
0 0 0
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 0
0 0 0
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 2 Tie 3 [Group A] 
A○11E  A○12E  A○13E  A○14E  A○15E  
0 0 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
0 0 0
0 1 0
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
1 1 1
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 3 [Group A] 
A○16E  A○17E  A○18E  A○19E  A○20E  
1 1 0
1 1 1
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
0 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
0 1 1
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 3 [Group B] 
A○21E  A○22E  A○23E  A○24E  A○25E  
1 0 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 3 [Group B] Tie 3 [Group C] 
A○26E  A○27E  A○28E  A○29E  A○30E  
1 0 1
0 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
0 1 0
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 0 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
Tie 3 [Group C] 
A○31E  A○32E  A○33E  A○34E  A○35E  
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 1
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
A○36E  A○37E  A○38E  A○39E  A○40E  
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 1
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 1
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
A○41E  A○42E  A○43E  A○44E   
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 0
1 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 1 1
 
 
 
  
 
1 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
 
 
 
  
 
 
Parameter Value 
Fundamentalists’ eagerness towards profits ( fα ) 1 
Positive‐feedback traders’ eagerness towards profits ( cα ) 1 
Wealth effect ( β ) 0.3 
Funding rate ( ,f cr r ) 0.1 
Adjustment scale to expected price ( ,ν µ ) 0.5 
Intensity to switch strategy (ϕ ) 0.1 
Noise traders’ reaction strength (γ ) 3 
Noise traders’ proportion in the market (ξ ) 0.3 
Market’s sensitivity to the demand of stock (θ ) 0.001 
Total number of traders in the market ( n ) 1000 
Initial positive‐feedback traders’ proportion in the market ( 0κ ) 0.35 
Initial fundamental value ( *0p ) 100 
Initial stock price ( 0p ) 100 
Table 1： Initial settings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 10l =  500l =  
Augmented Dickey‐Fuller test 
p‐value 0.001 0.001 
test statistics -157.894 -118.121 
critical value for the test -2.861 -2.861 
Phillips‐Perron test 
p‐value 0.001 0.001 
test statistics -157.895 -118.196 
critical value for the test -3.412 -3.412 
Kwiatkowski‐Phillips‐Schmidt‐Shin test 
p‐value 0.100 0.010 
test statistics 0.026 0.399 
critical value for the test 0.146 0.146 
Table 2： Unit root test results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 1：Scenarios for 10,  500l =  
 
 
 
Figure 2：Autocorrelations of simulated returns for 10,  500l =  
 
 
 Figure 3：Autocorrelations of absolute simulated returns for 10,  500l =  
 
 
 
Figure 4：Trajectory of ftα  and 
c
tr  (left) and transitions of states (right), 10l =  
 
 
 Figure 5：Trajectory of ftα  and 
c
tr  (left) and transitions of states (right), 500l =  
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Figure 6：Markov transition matrix 
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Figure 7：Perron‐Frobenius transition matrix 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 8：State transitions as l  vary, t‐distributed 
 
 
 
Figure 9：State transitions as l  vary, α ‐stable‐distributed 
 
 
  
Figure 10：State transitions as l  vary, GARCH‐Normal process 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11：State transitions as initial cr  equals 0.3 
 
 
 
  
Figure 12：State transitions as ϑ  vary, t‐distributed 
 
 
 
Figure 13：Inertia as initial cr  equals 0.1 (normal, t, and FIGARCH) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14：Inertia as initial cr  equals 0.1 (normal, t, and FIGARCH) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15：Inertia as initial cr  equals 0.1 (α ‐stable and GARCH) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16：Inertia as initial cr  larger than 0.3 
 
 
 
Figure 17：Total scores comparison, t–distributed 
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Figure 18：Markov trajectory entropy 
 
